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by intrinsic genetic programs and phenotype determina-
tion regulated by extracellular signals. The authors are
well positioned to dissect these two paradigms, for ex-
ample, by using temporally inducible Cre lines to ablate
Runx factors in DRG after establishment of the sensory
circuitry.
One unresolved question is the role of the Runx bind-
ing partner CBFb. CBFb does not exhibit DNA binding
affinity by itself but rather modulates Runx activities by
changing its conformation (Ito, 2004). CBFb is highly ex-
pressed in postnatal DRG and trigeminal ganglia (GNF,
2003). It will be most interesting through genetic analysis
to determine the overlap in phenotypic consequences of
CBFb compared to Runx1 and Runx3 ablation in DRG
neurons.
In sum, these three studies substantially expand our
knowledge about transcriptional regulation of DRG neu-
ronal identity and central axon patterning. They demon-
strate that expression of Runx1 and Runx3 consolidate
and specify traits of nociceptive and proprioceptive
DRG neurons, respectively. The studies of Kramer
et al. (2006) and Chen et al. (2006a) agree that Runx fac-
tors have critical functions in suppressing markers nor-
mally downregulated in specific populations during
development. Chen et al. (2006a) further demonstrate
a requirement for Runx1 in expression of a variety of
proteins that are critical to the normal functioning of
nociceptive neurons. Finally, both gain-of-function and
loss-of-function studies show that Runx1 and Runx3
regulate sensory axon trajectories in the spinal cord
toward appropriate terminal fields.
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Can Warp Your Mind
Keeping pace with a constantly changing world re-
quires the ability to make predictions about the future
on a variety of timescales. A very basic example of this
is the ability to predict the future location of a moving
object in the brief time that it takes to perceive and re-
spond to that object. In this issue of Neuron, experi-
ments by Sundberg, Fallah, and Reynolds reveal a
potential neural substrate for making short-range pre-
dictions about motion in visual area V4.
We are forever destined to live in the past. Due to neural
transmission delays, the sensations we experience are
always a fraction of a second behind the events that
evoke them. The time differences involved may be
slight, yet they represent a distinct disadvantage when
dealing with a world full of moving objects, particularly
if some of those objects are large, heavy, and rapidly ap-
proaching. How the primate visual cortex accurately es-
timates the position of moving stimuli in the face of neu-
ral tarrying is the subject of a current study by Sundberg,
Fallah and Reynolds (Sundberg et al., 2006). By perform-
ing parallel studies in humans and monkeys, these au-
thors provide perceptual and physiological evidence
that a moving target shifts the position of neuronal re-
ceptive fields in extrastriate visual area V4, thereby cre-
ating a wrinkle in the fabric of visual space. The result is
that we perceive not the true position of the target, but
its presumed future whereabouts. This kind of short-
range prediction allows us to keep a step ahead of our
sluggish brains and regain a semblance of simultaneity
with reality. In other words, we experience the present
by predicting the future of things that happened in the
past.
This all works out because inertia causes objects to
move in a predictable manner—a tendency codified by
Newton’s First Law of Motion. But do our brains actually
take advantage of this predictability? Some of the first
evidence that they do came from the study of eye move-
ments. The primate oculomotor system uses a variety of
strategies to keep the image of a moving target on the
fovea despite visual-motor processing delays. One
such strategy is used when making rapid eye
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328movements called saccades. Careful studies have
found that saccades are programmed based on an esti-
mate of target position taken some 100 ms prior to the
initiation of the movement (Gellman and Carl, 1991).
For an object moving at a moderate speed, this delay
could cause the eye to undershoot the target by an
amount that is larger than the fovea itself. Yet saccades
made to moving targets show no such error, because
their programming includes a predictive component
that compensates for the velocity of the target (Ron
et al., 1989; Keller and Johnsen, 1990). These predic-
tions require an intact striate cortex (Segraves et al.,
1987).
In the perceptual domain, Donald M. MacKay discov-
ered evidence of motion extrapolation while working in
a darkened laboratory illuminated only by a strobe light
and glowing instrument dials. During eye movements,
the instrument dials sometimes seemed to move inde-
pendently of their intermittently illuminated surround-
ings (MacKay, 1958). This effect can be reproduced in
a dark room by using a light-emitting diode, a strobe
light, and a ping-pong paddle. Attach the LED in the
middle of the paddle’s blade and adjust the strobe fre-
quency to about five flashes per second. When the pad-
dle is waved, the LED appears to float free of the surface
to which it is attached. This phenomenon has come to
be known as the ‘‘flash-lag’’ effect (Nijhawan, 1994), be-
cause the surface that is transiently illuminated by the
flashing strobe appears to lag behind the continuously
lit moving target.
Mislocalization of moving stimuli can be observed
without the aid of a strobe light, as was demonstrated
by Russell and Karen DeValois (DeValois and DeValois,
1991). They showed that a stationary window containing
a set of moving bars (Figure 1) was perceived as being
displaced in the direction of motion of the bars. The illu-
sion is nicely demonstrated if one arranges three such
stimuli in a column and alternates their direction. When
the bars are set in motion, the stimuli appear dramati-
cally misaligned (see Movie S1 in the Supplemental
Data available online).
Sundberg et al.’s experiments take advantage of
a similar motion illusion originally reported by Cai and
Schlag (2001). In this case, the observer sees a moving
blue line that briefly changes color to red. When queried
about the position of the red line, observers consistently
report that it appears ahead of its true location. That is,
the red line appears displaced in the direction of motion.
Sundberg et al. recorded from neurons in visual area V4
of awake monkeys viewing this stimulus. The investiga-
tors found that V4 neurons responded to the color
change and that this response varied depending on
the position of the flashed line within the receptive field.
However, the critical observation is that the response
evoked by the flash was modulated by the motion of
the target as if the receptive field had shifted by a small
amount. The direction of the receptive field shift was
opposite to the direction of target motion, as if the cell
had been recruited by a wave of activity preceding the
target.
A number of explanations for the perceived mislocal-
ization of moving stimuli have been proposed (see Nijha-
wan, 2002), but it isn’t yet clear which is correct or even if
there is a single phenomenon requiring a unitary expla-nation. What is clear is that predictive responses are
seen as early as the retina (Berry et al., 1999) and can
be demonstrated in very simple neural network models.
One such model is illustrated in Figure 2. It comprises
a two-dimensional sheet of Hodgkin-Huxley neurons.
The neurons have excitatory and inhibitory connections
whose weights are determined by a two-dimensional
‘‘mexican hat’’ function. The network is spatially isotro-
pic, yet a moving stimulus creates a traveling wave of
activity the center of which tends to precede the stimu-
lus (Figure 2A and Movie S2). The brief explanation for
this behavior is that the moving target leaves a trail of re-
fractory neurons in its wake so that spiking activity is
shifted toward the leading edge. From the perspective
of a single neuron in the network, activity anticipates
both the arrival and departure of the stimulus. Hence,
it is as if the receptive field of the neuron is shifted in a di-
rection opposite to that of the stimulus motion. This is
analogous to the effect observed by Sundberg et al. in
area V4.
So far, then, there is evidence that moving targets can
evoke predictive responses in at least two widely sepa-
rated parts of the visual system. Given that a similar ef-
fect is seen in a generic network model, it is possible that
the phenomenon is ubiquitous in visual cortex as well as
other topographically mapped parts of the brain, includ-
ing other sensory systems. But relating receptive field
shifts to perception requires that the magnitude of
the perceptual and physiological effects agree quantita-
tively. A strength of the Sundberg et al. study is that they
Figure 1. DeValois Motion Illusion
Motion illusion reported by DeValois and DeValois (1991). (Left col-
umn) Each stimulus is a set of light/dark bars within a stationary win-
dow. Three such stimuli are arranged in a column such that their cen-
ters are vertically aligned. (Right column) When the bars are set in
motion, the perceived location of the stimulus is shifted.
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observers and found that under some conditions it
closely matched the neuronal shift in monkey V4. If
one were to repeat the Sundberg et al. experiment in
different visual areas and find receptive field shifts of dif-
ferent magnitudes, then one could argue that the area
in which the neuronal shift most closely matched the
perceptual shift plays a special role in the construction
of visual awareness.
However, Sundberg et al. also found that V4 neurons
had shifted receptive fields under conditions where hu-
man observers perceived no illusory displacement of
the flashed stimulus. They therefore propose that V4
represents only one of several interpretations of the vi-
sual stimulus, with other interpretations being repre-
Figure 2. Neural Network Model Comprising a Two-Dimensional Ar-
ray of Hodgkin-Huxley Neurons with Symmetric Excitatory and In-
hibitory Connections
(A) Two-dimensional activity map where each location represents
the membrane potential of a single neuron. The green curve repre-
sents a cross-section of the stimulus, which has a Gaussian lumi-
nance profile and is moving to the right (arrow). The green x repre-
sents the center of the stimulus.
(B) Stimulus profile (green) and average network activity collapsed
across the vertical axis (red). The vertical lines indicate the cen-
ters-of-mass of the stimulus and network activity profiles.
(C) Stimulus position encoded by the network (y axis) against true
stimulus position (x axis).sented in other cortical areas. The brain then chooses
the interpretation that best fits the sensory evidence
and is consistent with prior experience and current be-
havioral goals. This idea recalls the ‘‘multiple drafts’’
model of consciousness proposed by Dennett and Kins-
bourne (1992), in which perceptual representations are
considered to be a product of the brain’s interpretive
processes, not a direct reflection of the sequence of
events making up those processes. According to this
view, subjective experience is similar to a movie spliced
together from a Rashomon-like set of alternative scenar-
ios. In the brain’s editing room, even space and time can
be manipulated so that we see what we expect to see.
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://
www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/49/3/327/DC1/.
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